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MORE ON VEILS: REPLY TO LEVITT AND MUELLER 
Chad Flanders• 
I thank Justin Levitt and Derek Mueller for their thoughtful replies to 
my article, which have helped me (at least) to understand my own 
position better. I also thank the Florida Law Review for giving me the 
opportunity to briefly respond to them. I can't (and probably couldn't) 
give detailed or persuasive answers to their questions; instead, I want to 
flag some issues that they bring up, and which deserve fuller 
consideration than I was able to give in my article. 
1. Veils, Thick and Thin. Levitt makes an excellent point almost 
incidentally in his reply to my piece, which I want to leap on and 
exploit: the "veil of ignorance" isn't necessarily fixed to one level of 
"thickness" or "thinness." If we think that there are more things we 
should put "behind the veil of ignorance" (have a "thicker veil," as 
Levitt's title commends) then there is nothing in principle about my 
approach that says that, no, we cannot, or that political party affiliation 
is the only thing that we can put behind the veil. In this way, then, the 
veil is a generic modeling device, a way to think about the concept of 
neutrality when it comes to election rules and possibly other rules as 
well. But I hasten to add that "thicker" is not always better. Whether we 
want to put more things behind the veil will usually depend on two 
things (1) whether it is feasible to do so (that is, whether we can 
imagine many situations in which parties will be ignorant in ways that 
the veil requires) and (2) whether it is desirable (that is, whether think 
more things should be excluded from consideration when deliberating 
about election rules). 1 
2. The advantages o f  incumbency. Levitt in particular, says that we 
should make the veil "thicker" with regards to incumbency. I tried to 
address this problem in my original article but I ended up mostly 
punting on it. 2 My "veil" focuses on the effect of partisanship in 
designing rules for elections: distrust those rules that were made when 
the people making them knew or even intended that they would favor 
one party (namely, their own) over the other. But Levitt asks about 
another self-dealing problem, and perhaps a more serious one. What 
about rules that favor the people in power over newcomers? 
Certainly these are rules that are self-dealing in a similar way to that 
rule that favor our party can be self-dealing. Levitt cites my own 
• Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law; Visiting Fulbright 
Lecturer, Nanjing University School of Law (2012-13). Thanks to James Boyer for research 
assistance. 
I. I apply these two grounds to testing whether we should put "incumbency" behind a
veil of ignorance in the next section. 
2. Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil o f  Ignorance, 64 FL. L. REV. 1369, 1385 n. 
65 (2012) [hereinafter Veil]. 
2 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 65 
example of Alaska's rules for write-in ballots as an example of a 
possible incumbent-favoring rule. The rules may not favor one party 
over another (why think that one party will usually have harder-to-spell 
names?), but it might well favor the dominant two parties, that is, the 
parties already in power. 3 Why not make the veil thicker, and put 
"incumbency" behind the veil as well? 
I have two relatively untutored reactions to this. The first is about 
feasibility. If we were suspicious about rules that were passed intended 
to favor those in power, we'd have to be suspicious about nearly all 
rules governing elections. As Justice Scalia has written, the first instinct 
of power is to retain power,4 and so most things that legislatures do 
regarding their own power will be about (a) increasing it, (b) holding on 
to it, and (c) not losing it. Are most or all election laws presumptively 
non-neutral? 
Nor I am sure we know what rules really do favor those in power, 
and this may be the more important point. Sometimes rules have 
unintended consequences, and those rules that incumbents pass to help 
themselves end up hurting them. So do we make a presumption against 
all rules that favor incumbents, or only those rules that actually help 
them, and how do we tell which ones those are? More to the point, how 
do judges tell this? (Consider: is there an obviously right answer as to 
whether campaign finance restrictions help incumbents or not?) By 
contrast, I suspect we can usually tell when rules are intended to help a 
particular party and when they will actually help that party. 
The second reaction I have is about the desirability of a thicker, anti-
incumbency "veil." Unlike partisanship, pro-incumbency rules might 
have something to say in their favor. That is, I think having some 
legislators be "entrenched" isn't necessarily a bad thing. 5 Incumbency 
can bring expertise, experience, seniority, etc. A rotating coterie of 
young legislators may not be what we want. In short, I think we might 
have more to worry about with excessive partisanship in election law6 
rather than excessive incumbency (although the two phenomena are 
probably not unrelated). 
3. Interestingly, as Levitt notes, Lisa Murkowski was the incumbent in the Alaska case: 
and so the rules about write-in candidates had the chance to end up hurting her. But such a case 
(in incumbent running as a write-in) is surely the outlier. 
4. McConnell v. Fed. Elect'n Comm., 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring 
and dissenting) ("The first instinct of power is the retention of power . . .  "). 
S. For an elaboration of this point of view, see Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of  Foxes 
Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting 
Gerrymanders, I 16 HARV. L. REv. 649, 667 (2002) (discussing advantages of "insider self-
dealing"). 
6. For a book length examination of the problems of partisanship in election law, see 
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION 
MELTDOWN (2012) 
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3. Metacanons. Levitt suggests that the veil in my paper has no 
substantive content, and that it amounts, at best, to a canon about how to 
use a canon (namely, the "democracy canon"\  This may be right and 
may sound rather modest, perhaps too modest. 8 But Levitt's insight here 
might be expanded to a more general question about the use of 
interpretive canons: can there be rules about how to apply rules of 
interpretation? 9 Or do they collapse into simply specifying (even 
modifying) the original rule? If it's the latter case, then there really 
aren't any metacanons, just different canons, in which case I have not 
proposed a metacanon, but only a revised democracy canon. There are 
deep questions here which may quickly lead us into the swamp of 
philosophical debates about following a rule. 10 
Let me gently step over that swamp, and simply say this about the 
democracy canons and perhaps metacanons more generally. When you 
have a canon, there can be a temptation to use that canon, whether this 
is the democracy canon, the rule of lenity, etc., etc., even when the 
statute is only possibly ambiguous. My piece is mainly a caution not to 
overuse the democracy canon, to not try to find ambiguity when we can 
find plain meaning just as easily. 11 
After all, some ambiguities are deeper, and more problematic than 
other ambiguities. I think if you stare hard enough and long enough, 
most statutes can look ambiguous (this is what we often try to do as 
teachers: why can't we read the statute this way? Or that way? Or both 
ways at once? 12). So my article may just serve as a caution to judges 
7. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REv. 69 (2009). 
8. As I elaborate in my response to Mueller, I do mean to defend a different kind of
democracy (legislative or second-order democracy) than the kind the democracy canon is 
chiefly concerned with (participatory or popular democracy). Further, the veil of ignorance 
device itself is meant to represent a kind of neutrality that we should aspire to in election law; 
this is a substantive ideal as well. 
9. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 468 (20 I 0) ( discussion of some so-called "metacanons"). 
10. See generally, SAUL KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN: ON RULES & PRIVATE LANGUAGE ch. 2
(1982) (so-called "paradox of rule-following," involving the problem of following a rule when 
there are no rules about how to follow the rule). 
11. I give another example of this when discussing Mueller's reply, below. 
12. Levitt gives a virtuoso example of this in his reply. See Justin Levitt, You're Gonna
Need a Thicker Veil, 65 Fla. L. Rev. F. I, 3 n.10 ("If a name 'appears' on the declaration of 
candidacy in printed Times New Roman font, does a write-in vote count when the name is 
written on the ballot in cursive? In blue ink? In all caps? In 'Last Name, First Name' order?"). 
Levitt also objects to my reading of the relevant statutes in the Emmanuel case, citing a 
statute about the rules governing residency for electors. Id. But there may be good reasons for 
having stricter residency requirements for candidates than voters. See Flanders, Veil, at 1396 
("We can imagine reasons why we would want to have candidates who know something about 
the area and its people; we might have lower standards for voter familiarity. Voters are not 
going to govern, candidates are, and governance requires familiarity with people and places of a 
type that takes time to acquire. Carpetbagging candidates might be worse than carpetbagging 
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and scholars: don't rush to use the democracy canon. It's not a one-size 
fits all remedy for election law cases. Sometimes it can be useful, and 
should be used, but other times we have pretty good reasons not to use 
it, and to try harder to figure out the "plain meaning." 
4. Term Limits and Democracy. Mueller's reply 13 focuses on term
limits, and gives me a chance to revisit one of my favorite cases, a short 
Alaska opinion decided a few years ago, Municipality o f  Anchorage v. 
Mjos. 14 In that case, Mjos had served half of a previous office holder's 
term and another two full terms. The question the case raised was, did a 
term limit statute that prevented someone from running for office after 
he had served "three consecutive terms" mean that Mjos couldn't run 
again? Mjos had served part o f  a term and a two full terms, but the 
statute didn't distinguish between the partial and full terms: it just said 
"consecutive terms." 
In making its decision, the court employed (what else?) the 
democracy canon. Because it was ambiguous what "three consecutive 
terms" meant, the court said that Mjos should be allowed to run, to give 
(the court elaborated) the final decision to the voters as to whether Mjos 
deserved another term. "Statutes dealing with the right of voters to 
choose public officials and the right of citizens to aspire to and hold 
public office," the Alaska court quoted, "should receive a liberal 
construction in favor of assuring the right to exercise freedom of choice 
in selecting public officials and also the right to aspire to and hold 
public office." 15 The term limit statute was found not to apply, and Mjos 
got a chance to run for another "term." 
What Mueller helps us see is that "democracy" isn't just on one side 
of the ledger in cases like Mjos It is not a matter between upholding the 
term limits as against the will of the people. This paints the term limits 
measure as something antithetical to the will of them people, but this is 
not the case because the popular vote at elections is not the only way 
the will o f  the people can be expressed. What's more, people can have 
preferences not just about actually voting, but also about what 
constraints voting should operate under. They might want to limit their 
choices in some cases. 16 Mueller's reply helps us see the significance of  
an early line in the facts of Mjos, which we might otherwise disregard: 
"This term limit provision was added to the Municipal Charter by 
popular vote in 1990." 17
voters. Or at least a legislature could think so."). 
13. Disfavored Candidates and the Democracy Canon (manuscript). 
14. 179P.3d941 (Alaska2008).
15. Id. at 943n. I (quoting 63C AM.JUR.2d Public Officers and Employees§ 53 (1997). 
16. In other cases, the people might not want limit their choices. They might think (as I
suggested in my response to Levitt inji·a) that people should be able to hold multiple terms. 
17. Mjos, 179 P.3d at 942 (emphasis added). 
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In short, voters have preferences, but they can also have preferences 
about how to exercise those preferences. So long as the limits on those 
preferences (such as term limits) are also arrived at by a recognizably 
democratic process, then we shouldn't reach for the democracy canon; 
that is, we should try to find ambiguity where there isn't any, or where 
we can reasonably find that there isn't. Here again, Mjos is an object 
lesson: the court relied on the democracy canon to find the term limit 
statute didn't apply, even though it conceded that interpreting the statute 
to apply was "logical and more consistent with established principles of 
statutory interpretation." 18 
This leads me back to one of the major conclusions of  my original 
article. Maximizing voter choice, whether by letting more people run or 
by increasing participation, isn't the only value in cases like Mjos. Even 
more interestingly, it is not even the only democratic value. 
18. Id. at 943. 

